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Abstract 
 
In this paper we study whether an IRPEF reform aimed at reducing the tax burden on 
labour income - via the enlargement of the tax base due to the inclusion of imputed rent 
for owner-occupied dwellings - can achieve a political majority. Our main result is that 
the share of the winners is consistent - between 46 and 48 percent - while the share of 
the losers is around one third of all taxpayers. The percentage of winners is further 
increased when considering households instead of individual taxpayers; however, the 
share of losers is also substantial. Overall, then, a political majority supporting the 
change is presumably obtainable. Finally, it can be seen that reducing the tax wedge on 
labour income while contemporaneously taxing more housing, would generate a 
redistribution towards younger generations.  
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1. Introduction 
The need to improve economic growth is a common problem in the agenda of European 
governments, and is especially pressing for countries – like Italy – with a high level of 
public debt. General recipes for improving economic growth include a wide array of 
policies, both in terms of more effective and lowered expenditures, and reduced taxes. 
Suggestions from the OECD embrace, for instance, not only the need to reduce public 
ownership and regulatory barriers to competition, and to improve educational outcomes, 
but also the need to reduce the tax wedge on labour income (OECD, 2010a). This last 
problem is particularly severe in Italy, since – according to the OECD (2010b) – the 
country is among the OECD nations that levies a relatively high tax and social security 
burden on labour income. Most recent estimates for 2009 suggest that single taxpayers 
on average earnings take home less than 55 percent of what they cost to their employer, 
while taxpayers on high earnings take home less than 50 percent. Most notably, the 
average tax wedge in Italy is about 10 percentage points higher than the OECD average. 
Given these figures, it is hardly surprising that the reduction of the tax burden on labour 
income has been considered to be one of the highest priorities by most recent Italian 
governments. But the attempts to reduce taxes on labour have not had much success for 
at least two reasons: on the one hand, because there are increasing difficulties in 
squeezing expenditures in the short run; on the other hand, because alternative tax bases 
are hard to find, and existing tax rates cannot be further augmented. In this respect, 
however, a potential tax base which has shown a considerable increase in recent years 
and seems to have been completely forgotten by Italian governments is the figurative 
income (and the related wealth) from homeownership. Given the high proportion of 
homeownership and the sharp increase in market prices in the housing market, the 
potential tax base will be quite large1. But at present, homeownership is favoured in 
terms of taxes along several dimensions: the main residence is currently exempted both 
from Personal Income Tax (IRPEF) and from Property Tax (ICI). This notwithstanding, 
there are a number of tax credits linked to homeownership (e.g. related to interest paid 
on mortgages). Moreover, imputed rents considered in the tax base (e.g. for dwellings 
other than the main residence) are quite far from current market values, in fact 
exempting a large share of the potential tax base. 
One very simple reform to be considered in order to exploit this forgotten tax base is to 
introduce imputed rents from homeownership in the IRPEF tax base. A quite similar 
proposal has been recently advanced by a group of highly reputed economists for the 
UK (see the “Mirrlees Review”, in Mirrlees – Adam – Besley – Blundell – Bond – 
Chote – Gammie – Johnson – Myles – Poterba, 2011). In the case of Italy, taxing 
imputed rents from homeownership will allow the government to reduce the tax wedge 
on labour incomes. However, since the estimated labour supply elasticity appears to be 
highest for the poor (e.g. Aaberge – Colombino – Strøm, 1999), the reduction in the tax 
                                                 
1 According to available data from official sources - the Agenzia del Territorio and its Osservatorio del 
Mercato Immobiliare – housing prices registered a 27percent increase between 2004 and 2009 at the 
national level, with only very minor reductions from the peak in 2008 (Agenzia del Territorio, 2010). 
However, differences are substantial across different areas of the country and between provincial towns 
and other minor cities. Provincial towns in the two islands made the highest growth (+ 44percent); the 
lowest increase was registered for non capital cities in the North (+ 18percent). More details are available 
in Table A.1 in the Appendix. A striking feature of the Italian housing market becomes clear when 
looking at other countries. Taking for instance the USA, the S&P Case-Shiller US National Price Index 
recorded a variation close to zero over the same period, as the result of the expansion of more than 
35percent up to the end of 2006, followed by a burst of the housing bubble up to the first quarter of 2009. 
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wedge should be concentrated on incomes in the lowest brackets in order to boost 
economic growth. Besides these expected direct effects on the labour supply of such a 
reform, increasing housing taxation can have other potentially beneficial indirect effects 
on growth, via an improved performance on the part of the labour market. In fact, 
without denying the benefits from homeownership (in terms of educational outcomes or 
reduced crime), taxing homeownership will make people more mobile, hence 
presumably reducing unemployment (e.g. the seminal work by Oswald, 1999) and 
education-job mismatches (e.g. Hensen – de Vries – Cörvers, 2009), but also increasing 
educational opportunities (e.g. Makovec, 2006). 
Why then has no Italian government tried to modify housing taxation, and actually 
further increase the advantages for homeowners in recent years? One very simple 
answer is that – given the large number of homeowners - housing taxation is a highly 
sensitive political field, and politicians look for short-run returns, all of which makes 
housing taxation a sort of taboo in Italian politics2. But taboos are often generated by 
prejudices and ignorance. In this paper we attempt to increase our understanding of the 
impact of a policy reform aimed at introducing imputed rents from homeownership in 
the IRPEF tax base. By using a microsimulation model precisely designed to examine 
housing taxation in Italy (Pellegrino – Piacenza – Turati, 2010a), we study in particular 
the distributional impact of alternative reforms all aimed at increasing housing taxation 
while contemporaneously reducing the labour tax wedge. We show how gainers and 
losers are distributed across the income distribution, and discuss whether such reforms 
can have political success by characterising who will vote in favour, and who will be 
against the reform. Our main result is that, under all the three scenarios, the share of 
winners is consistent - between 46 and 48 percent - while the share of losers is around 
one third of taxpayers. The percentage of winners is further increased when considering 
households instead of individual taxpayers, at about 50 percent; however, the share of 
losers is also substantial in this case, at about 40 percent. As a result, a political majority 
supporting the change is presumably obtainable. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief history of 
housing taxation in Italy. Section 3 is devoted to a presentation of the main statistics 
from the empirical exercise and the results from simulations including imputed rent in 
the definition of the PIT gross income. Section 4 contains a discussion of the 
simulations under three different reform scenarios. Section 5 offers a brief conclusion 
and recommendations. 
 
 
2. A brief history of housing taxation in Italy 
According to available evidence for 2010, Italy is a Western country where the ratio 
between mean wealth and mean income is among the highest at more than 5 (Shorrocks 
– Davies – Lluberas, 2010). Only the UK fares similarly (4.9), while for the US this 
ratio falls to 3.6. Most of this household wealth is invested in housing properties: in 
Europe, Italy is one of the nations – together again with the UK, but also with other 
Mediterranean countries such as Spain – where the proportion of homeowners is the 
highest. There are, however, differences with respect to the UK that characterise Italy as 
a unique case: first, the level of private debt is lower in Italy than in the UK, partly 
                                                 
2 Notice for instance that the recent draft bill of August 4th, 2010 - aimed at reforming the system of 
Municipalities’ funding, the so-called ‘Municipal federalism’ - explicitly maintain the advantages for 
homeowners for their main residence, and does not seem to suggest any adjustments with regard to rents.  
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because of stricter mortgage requirements and a different attitude on the part of Italian 
households toward debt; second, wealth is more equally distributed: median wealth is 
50 percent of mean wealth in Italy, while only 34 percent in the UK (and much less so, 
at 20 percent, in the US (Shorrocks – Davies – Lluberas, 2010)). This last feature of the 
‘Italian case’ clearly highlights why housing taxation has been considered by Italian 
governments as one of the tool to gain short-run political consensus. As a result of this 
situation, housing is largely favoured by the tax system: figurative income from the 
main residence is now basically exempted from both Personal Income Tax (IRPEF) and 
Property Tax (ICI), while contemporaneously, tax credits for mortgage interests are 
available for home owners.  
As our aim here is to study a reform involving a reduction in the tax wedge on labour 
incomes, we focus on IRPEF. The main features of housing taxation during the last two 
decades are summarised in Appendix Table A.2. Note that, up to 1996, the Tax Code 
included the main residence cadastral income R  in the IRPEF tax base. However, one 
can argue that the cadastral income was last revised by the Decreto Ministeriale 20th 
January 1990 according to average market values in 1988-1989, and these values were 
made effective from 1992, so that those included in the tax base were largely different 
from current market values even at that time, in fact exempting a large share of the 
potential tax base3. To partially “correct” this divergence, from 1997 onwards the Tax 
Code considers  05.1* RR  , with a mild re-evaluation of 5 percent of the 1988-1989 
average rents. Hence, the cadastral income is currently frozen approximately at the 1990 
values. 
Regardless of this favour, the Tax Code further benefited owners by making a number 
of tax allowances available during the years, a situation leading to a complete formal 
exemption from 2000 onwards. Up to 1996, the allowance to be subtracted from the 
main residence cadastral income was 516.46 euros; this was raised to 568.10 euros in 
the period 1997-1998. In fact, given the average level of rents, these allowances 
basically exempted the main residence for a large proportion of taxpayers well before 
the introduction of the formal exemption.   
A number of tax credits have also been made available to homeowners despite the 
complete exemption granted to their main residence. These include in particular, tax 
credits for mortgage interest and maintenance and restructuring expenditure. Tax credits 
are defined according to a percentage of costs sustained by the homeowner, up to a 
certain threshold. Fiscal rules have changed both the percentage and the threshold over 
the years, slightly reducing the favour granted to homeowners. Consider mortgage 
interests: in the period 1995-1997 the tax credit was set equal to 22 percent of paid 
interest, up to about 3,500 euros (hence, fixing the maximum tax saving at about 770 
euros per taxpayer). Starting from 1998, the 22 percent allowance has been reduced to 
19 percent. From 2008 onwards – despite the main residence being exempted - the tax 
credit is still equal to 19 percent, but it is now applied on interest payments up to 4,000 
euros (generating a maximum saving of 760 euros). 
Since 1998, a tax credit has also been allowed for maintenance and restructuring 
expenditure. Rules are quite similar to those for mortgage interest, with the only 
difference being that those for restructuring generate savings that can be spread over a 
                                                 
3 Unfortunately, official data on housing prices from the Osservatorio del Mercato Immobiliare are not 
available for this period. However, one can consider changes in the cost of building a residential dwelling 
as a proxy for changes in the market prices of private dwellings. According to data provided by ISTAT, 
an increase of about 25percent in these costs has been registered between 1989 and 1992. 
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number of years. In particular, the credit has to be split over 5 or 10 years for 
expenditures made in the period 1998-2001, and over 10 years for expenditures made 
from 2002 onwards. As for allowances, in the period 1998-1999 and in almost all of 
2006, the tax credit is equal to 41percent of the expenditure; from 2000 (but for almost 
all of 2006) it was equal to 36 percent. In the period 1998-2002 the expenditure limit is 
raised to 77,468.53 euros.  However, it decreased to 48,000 euros from 2003 onwards. 
Apart from 2006, the expenditure limit refers to each owner and to each dwelling. 
Taxation is less favourable for dwellings which are not a main residence. A slightly 
higher rent is considered for unoccupied or holiday homes. Up to 1996, the Tax Code 
considered the cadastral income, augmented by one third, as part of the PIT gross 
income. From 1997 onwards, the Tax Code considered the same mild re-evaluation of 
the main residence rent. A tax credit for mortgage interest is available for dwellings 
other than the main residence from 1993 onwards. It is equal to 27percent of the interest 
payments for each signer of the mortgage, up to about 2,000 euros. Only mortgages 
signed before 1993 allow the tax credit. Moreover, if the interest payments for the main 
residence are more than about 2,000 euros, no interest payments on dwellings other than 
the main residence can be considered for tax credit purposes. For a mortgage signed 
after 1993, no tax credits are allowed. From 1998 onwards, a tax credit for maintenance 
and restructuring expenditure is also allowed for this category of dwellings, with the 
same characteristics. 
To sum up, changes in housing taxation from the Nineties basically reduced the tax 
burden for homeowners: despite the sharp increase in market prices, taxable rents did 
not increase4, exempting a large share of the potential tax base; moreover, an explicit 
exemption was introduced for the main residence. Finally, despite the main residence 
being exempted, allowances for mortgage interest were maintained, and tax credits for 
maintenance expenditures were introduced. Of course, by favouring housing, Italian 
governments could not reduce the tax burden on labour incomes. Understanding the size 
of the potential correction once imputed rents in the IRPEF tax base have been 
introduced, is the goal of the following sections. 
 
 
3. Simulating the change in the IRPEF tax base 
To study how the IRPEF tax base would be modified by considering imputed rents, in 
this paper we make use of an updated version of the microsimulation model described 
in Pellegrino et al. (2010a) which, among the most important taxes and contributions 
characterizing the Italian fiscal system, focuses in particular on the main taxes on 
housing. The model considers as input data that provided by the Bank of Italy in its 
2010 Survey on Households’ Income and Wealth (hereafter SHIW-BI). The Survey 
contains information on household income and wealth in the year 2008 (the latest 
available), covering 7,977 households, and 19,907 individuals. The sample is 
representative of the Italian population, composed of about 24 million households and 
60 million individuals (see Brandolini, 1999, and Bank of Italy, 2010, for details). 
Relevant information for the estimation of cadastral incomes and net imputed rents for 
both main residences and other dwellings includes: the market value of real estate, the 
size (in square meters) of the dwellings, the dwelling maintenance expenditures, the 
                                                 
4 At present, a market rent is considered only for rented dwellings: in this case, net income was equal to 
85 percent of the actual rent up to 2010. From 2011, a 19 percent (21 percent) withholding tax has been 
introduced on the whole actual rent. 
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interest paid on mortgages, and the initial mortgage debt. We refer to Pellegrino – 
Piacenza – Turati (2010a) for the techniques used in estimating the cadastral incomes, 
as well as the algorithm used in the transition from post- to pre-tax personal income 
with regard to each individual. The performance of the model is quite good: both results 
concerning the IRPEF gross income distribution and the number of dwellings, as well as 
the number of homeowners, are very close to the Ministry of Finance’s (2010) official 
statistics. 
Table 1 shows the household composition by tenure status according to the SHIW-BI 
dataset. There are about 24 million Italian households: 17.2 million (71.9 percent) are 
the owner-occupiers of their main residence, or life tenants (‘occupiers in usufruct’); 5.3 
million (22 percent) rent or occupy the dwelling under a redemption agreement (the so-
called “a riscatto”); finally, 1.5 million (6.2 percent) are rent-free tenants. Notice that 
almost all the owner-occupiers are not burdened with a mortgage, while only a small 
percentage (9.9 percent) has a mortgage. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Focusing on the distribution across the deciles of equivalent gross income, Table 1 
shows that the higher the decile, the higher the percentage of owner-occupiers within 
each decile, but the gap between the bottom and the top decile is relatively small (54.8 
percetn to 68 percent for households without a mortgage and 4.5 percent to 17.7 percent 
for households with a mortgage). This confirms one of the features of the ‘Italian case’ 
with respect to housing which has already been discussed, namely the more equal 
distribution of wealth in comparison with other countries (Shorrocks – Davies – 
Lluberas, 2010). As expected, the percentage of tenants and rent-free tenants within 
each decile decreases from 33.2 percent to 10.9 percent and from 7.5 percent to 3.4 
percent, respectively. 
Looking at the distribution of households by age class, Table 2 shows that the share of 
households still paying off their mortgage is decreasing with respect to the age of the 
household head as expected, while the opposite occurs when we consider owner-
occupiers without a mortgage. Moreover, tenancy is more likely among the youngest 
households. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
In Italy not only is the percentage of owner-occupier households very high, but also one 
quarter of households have at least another dwelling besides the main residence. 
According to the Ministry of Finance’s official statistics, the total number of dwellings 
owned by households are about 29.6 million. As we have already described, the number 
of main residences owned by households (considering full and bare properties) comes to 
about 17.2 million; by comparison, second homes owned by Italian households come to 
about 12.4 million. Most of them (about three quarters) are holiday homes or irregularly 
rented dwellings, while only about 3 million are second homes regularly rented by one 
household to another household. 
The total number of dwellings owned by households is very high in Italy when 
compared to other countries such as the UK (where the number of dwellings is about 25 
million, according to the Office for National Statistics), and their figurative income 
therefore represents a huge potential tax base. But – as already mentioned - rents 
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considered by the Tax Code are, on average, highly underestimated. According to our 
estimates, the average value of cadastral incomes is about five hundred euros per year5. 
Moreover, the overall value of the IRPEF tax base from housing represents only 
5percent of the overall tax base. 
Given this unexploited potential IRPEF tax base from housing whenever imputed rents 
instead of cadastral incomes are considered, the main goal of this paper is to evaluate 
alternative reforms, all aimed at reducing IRPEF marginal tax rates by introducing 
imputed rent from homeownership in the IRPEF tax base. In order to study this tax 
change, we consider the imputed rent only for owner-occupier households; following 
the actual Tax Code, no imputed rent for tenants and rent-free tenants is considered. 
The main problem for this kind of analysis concerns the definition of ‘imputed rent’. As 
discussed for instance by Frick – Grabka (2003) and Garner – Short (2009), there are 
several methods to define this notional income based on: a) the returns obtainable from 
alternative investments, like the capitalization-rate approach; b) the hedonic 
characteristics of a dwelling, like the selection/hedonic approach; c) the reported rental 
equivalence from individual surveys, like the (modified) market-value approach. Here 
we define net imputed rent (hereafter, IR) following a sort of modified market-value 
approach. We start from gross IR, considering the value interviewees indicated in 
SHIW-BI in their answers to the following question: “Assuming you wanted to rent this 
dwelling, what monthly rent do you or your household think could be charged?”. To 
obtain the net IR, we subtract mortgage interest and one tenth of maintenance 
expenditure from the gross IR. As Garner – Short (2009) have consistently shown, while 
there are some differences across different methods in the estimates of IR, and the 
modified market-value approach is likely to produce the highest values for low-income 
earners, the general conclusions in terms of distributional outcomes are not affected. 
According to most of the literature, excluding imputed rent from the definition of 
income amounts to a subsidy for owner-occupation, and it is likely to favour the highest 
income group (e.g., Aaron, 1970; Rosen, 1985) and to underestimate the well-being of 
elderly householders (Garner – Short, 2009). Including imputed rent in the tax base 
should therefore be equality enhancing6. 
Results concerning equivalent gross income distribution with and without imputed rents 
are presented in Table 37. Let the actual overall household average gross income be 100. 
Then, the actual mean gross income is about 104.7 for owner occupiers with a 
mortgage, and 129.5 for owner occupiers without a mortgage; on the other hand, it will 
be considerably lower for tenants (78.6) and for rent-free tenants (82). On the contrary, 
the relative positions are very different whenever the net IR is considered as a 
component of the personal income tax gross income: with respect to the actual situation, 
the overall gross income rises from 100 to 115.2, but it rises up to 127 for owner 
occupiers without a mortgage, and to 141.6 for owner occupiers with a mortgage. As 
long as tenants and rent-free tenants are not affected by the tax change, their income 
                                                 
5 Recall that income from other dwellings owned by households is the cadastral income for unoccupied 
dwellings or holiday houses, as well as irregularly rented dwellings; it is the actual rent for rented and 
declared dwellings. 
6 For an in-depth discussion of the distributional effects of including IR in the PIT tax base in the Italian 
case, see Pellegrino – Piacenza – Turati (2010b). 
7 In each scenario, we consider each individual’s IRPEF gross income, and then aggregate incomes at the 
household level. We consider all households in the dataset; in particular, we do not drop households with 
zero household income. In order to obtain the equivalent income, we adopt the Cutler Scale, and choose 
its parameters in order to minimize the re-ranking. 
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positions do not change with respect to the actual situation if they do not own any 
dwellings. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The inclusion of net IR yields a considerable reducing effect on income inequality, as 
already observed in other works (Frick – Grabka, 2003; D’Ambrosio – Gigliarano, 
2007): the Gini coefficient for equivalent household disposable gross income is .37815 
considering the reference distribution, and decreases to .36607 when including the net 
IR in the income definition. As expected, the Gini coefficient falls for owner-occupier 
households, and stays almost constant for tenants and rent-free tenants. 
Similar comments emerge also when decomposing the population by age group. 
Relative income positions when considering the reference distribution are: 89.4 if the 
head of the household is 35 years old or younger, 106.9 for the age class 35-65 years, 
and 91.1 for those older than 65 (Table 4). With the inclusion of the net IR, the 
corresponding values are 97.8, 120.8 and 111, respectively. Clearly, as the share of 
households which own the main residence increases with age, if net IR is considered, 
the higher variations of the Gini coefficient are registered in the top two classes, whilst 
the variation in the first age class is marginal. 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The important point to be stressed is that including the IR raises the IRPEF tax base by 
about one fifth. Hence, given the enlargement of the tax base, one can simulate 
alternative reforms of the tax structure by keeping IRPEF revenues at the actual level, 
and reducing marginal tax rates. This is the goal of the next Section. 
 
 
4. Simulating alternative IRPEF reforms: winners and losers under alternative 
scenarios 
 
4.1. The alternative reforms 
As including the IR substantially enlarges the IRPEF tax base, we can now simulate 
alternative reforms which keep IRPEF revenues constant at the current level, and reduce 
marginal tax rates with the goal of increasing the labour supply. In particular, we 
consider three different scenarios. The first one (SCENARIO 1) is based on the premise 
that labour supply elasticities differ across income deciles. As shown by Aaberge – 
Colombino – Strøm (1999), in Italy (as elsewhere), the elasticity of labour supply for 
the poor is higher than for the rich, both for males and females. Hence, if one wants to 
favour efficiency (and income growth), then the reduction in marginal tax rates should 
be higher for low income brackets. Table 5, col. SCENARIO 1, shows the reduction of tax 
rates that a reform of this type would allow, leaving tax deductions and tax credits 
unchanged with respect to the actual Tax Code.8 The reduction is consistent: it would be 
                                                 
8 We define this change in tax rates according to the following criteria: first, all tax brackets must benefit 
from a reduction in marginal tax rates; second, following the efficiency criterion, we consider changes in 
tax rates as a convex function of income; third, for administrative reasons, we avoid decimal changes in 
tax rates. We then fitted the convex function by leaving the variation referred to the first tax bracket as the 
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possible to reduce the marginal tax rates by 5.85 percentage points in the first bracket, 
by 5 percentage points in the second one, by 3 points in the third and fourth ones and by 
2 point in the last one. A second scenario (SCENARIO 2) considers a flat reduction of 
marginal rates in all brackets, again leaving tax deductions and credits unchanged. This 
second reform would allow a 4.97 percentage point reduction in all marginal rates 
(Table 5, col. SCENARIO 2), and can be considered an extreme case where the 
government does not take into account suggestions from the economic literature on 
labour supply elasticities. Notice that the large rebate is made possible by the consistent 
number of owners across all deciles in Italy. The third and last scenario we consider 
here (SCENARIO 3) emphasises efficiency to a greater extent, by allowing de facto an 
exemption for poor households for taxes due on housing incomes. This is obtained by 
introducing a tax credit for homeowners, linearly decreasing with respect to gross 
income, and re-computing marginal tax rates with respect to SCENARIO 1 in order to 
guarantee the condition of unchanged tax revenues. This last scenario allows us also to 
consider potential liquidity problems for low income households stemming from 
including a notional income in the tax base. Notice that Table 5, col. SCENARIO 3, shows 
potential reductions in tax rates when the tax credit vanishes at 10,000 euros. However, 
we also computed variations in marginal rates for different thresholds (up to 20,000 
euros). The results discussed below are substantially unchanged when considering these 
alternative hypotheses in terms of threshold. 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Tables 6 and 7 show how the distribution of IRPEF net income changes with respect to 
the current situation when considering these alternative scenarios. Let the 2008 mean 
net income be 100; this would increase to 119.3 under scenario 1, to 117.3 under 
scenario 2, and to 116.9 under scenario 3 (Table 6). The highest increase in mean net 
income would be registered for owner occupiers without a mortgage under scenario 1, 
and for owner occupiers with a mortgage under scenarios 2 and 3. These features of the 
reforms are reflected also in the Gini coefficients associated with each distribution of 
net income: the largest drop is recorded for owner occupiers without a mortgage in the 
first scenario, and for owners with a mortgage in the alternative scenarios. 
Distinguishing taxpayers by age classes, one can easily see that the smallest increase in 
net income is registered for young people (Table 7). This was largely expected since 
homeownership increases with respect to age. Notice however that despite ownership 
increasing with age, we do not observe sharp changes in the Gini coefficient as before. 
For the age class 35-65 years, the Gini coefficient varies from .33222 to about .3254 
under SCENARIOS 1 and 2, and .3205 under SCENARIO 3. For the elderly, the Gini drops 
by about 2 points under SCENARIO 1, but worsens under SCENARIOS 2 and 3. All these 
results are driven by the interplay among four different factors: the distribution of 
different types of owners across deciles, the distribution of IR across deciles, the 
distribution of labour incomes across deciles, and the distribution of tax cuts across 
deciles under the alternative scenarios. However, net incomes here include also notional 
incomes from IR. To understand whether or not these alternative reforms would have a 
political majority supporting the change, we need to consider monetary incomes only. 
This is done in the next Section. 
                                                                                                                                               
unknown of the equation. Notice however that, as will be clear below, the following conclusions are 
substantially unaffected by this choice. 
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TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2. Winners and losers 
In the previous Section we briefly discussed the impact on the distribution of net 
incomes stemming from alternative reforms aimed at reducing the tax wedge on labour 
income and contemporaneously increasing housing taxation (via the increase in the tax 
base), while keeping fiscal revenues constant. However, in order to judge the potential 
political success of these reforms, we need to ascertain how many there would be of 
gainers and the losers once the reform had been implemented. Only if the former are in 
the majority could the reform have political success. In particular, to identify winners 
and losers we need to evaluate monetary income once one of the alternative reforms 
discussed above is implemented, and then compare this with monetary income 
stemming from the application of current rules. We define “winners” as those taxpayers 
for whom the tax debt computed with the proposed rules is lower than with the current 
rules. For each reform scenario, we run two different exercises of this type: in the first 
one, we take into account individual taxpayers, and assume that winners will vote in 
favour of the reform independently of their situation at the household level; in the 
second one, we consider winners and losers at the household level. 
 
Individual taxpayers. Table 8 shows the percentage of winners and losers across income 
deciles when considering individual taxpayers. Overall, under SCENARIO 1, 48.4 percent 
of all taxpayers (about 20.1 million people) will gain from including IR in the IRPEF 
tax base, i.e. they will have a net tax debt lower than the one paid as a result of the 
current rules. About 17 percent of taxpayers (about 7.1 million people) would be 
indifferent, whilst 34.4 percent (about 14.3 million people) would definitely lose from 
the reform. If all the net gainers vote in favour of the reform, and only the net losers 
vote against it, the reform could have a political majority based on these numbers. 
Similar results emerge when considering alternative scenarios. 
 
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
Under SCENARIO 2, allowing for the same cut in all tax brackets, the share of winners 
would reduce to 46.8 percent, while 16.6 percent  would be indifferent. Under 
SCENARIO 3, the one favouring the poor most, the share of winners is 48 percent, but the 
number of individuals who would be indifferent is now 20.8 percent, so that only 
31.2percent would lose from the reform. This is therefore the scenario that maximises 
the consensus. 
Despite the reduction in the Gini coefficient observed at the aggregate level, notice that 
the distribution of winners and losers across income deciles is not uniform. In particular, 
most of the losers are concentrated in the bottom deciles, especially among the poorest, 
in both SCENARIO 1 and 2. The percentage of losers in the bottom deciles shrinks when 
moving to SCENARIO 3 because most taxpayers are now indifferent9. This makes clear 
                                                 
9 This share, however, remains constant under SCENARIO 3 when increasing the tax credit from 10,000 
euros to 20,000 euros, especially for the 1st and the 2nd decile. To observe a significant increase in the 
share of winners we need to move up to the 4th decile, and to increase the tax credit above 14,000 euros. 
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the role of tax credits for low income earners: their situation is substantially unchanged 
with respect to actual rules, even though IR is included in the tax base. On the contrary, 
the net gainers represent more than 50percent of people from the 4th decile onwards, 
under all the three scenarios. The highest share of winners is recorded for all the reforms 
at the 7th decile: 72.4 percent of taxpayers will gain from the reform under SCENARIO 1, 
68.9 percent under SCENARIO 2, and 69.8 percent under SCENARIO 3. Given the ratio 
between imputed rent and monetary income across deciles, this result is largely 
expected. Imputed rents have a larger impact for low income taxpayers than for high 
earners. Hence, reducing tax wedge on labour incomes will imply - in relative terms - a 
larger reduction in the amount of taxes to be paid, especially on the part of people in the 
top deciles, than for people in the bottom ones. 
Also the size of the average gains and losses will be different across income deciles, but 
substantially similar under the different scenarios (Table 9). Considering all taxpayers, 
the average gain will be 918 euros (3.8 percent of the actual PIT gross income) while 
average loss is about 1,300 euros (6.7 percent of the PIT gross income) under SCENARIO 
1. These figures become respectively 953 euros and 1,218 euros under SCENARIO 2, and 
824 euros and 1,452 euros under SCENARIO 3. However, the largest gain (ranging 
between 1,679 euros under SCENARIO 3 and 2,347 euros under SCENARIO 2) is always 
recorded for taxpayers in the top decile. Also the largest loss (between 2,700 and 2,800 
euro) is concentrated in the top decile, with the notable exception of SCENARIO 3: in this 
case, losers in the first decile also register a huge increase in their tax debts, but are a 
small minority (4.6 percent  of those in the bottom decile). Most of these taxpayers are 
people with a very low monetary income, but with a large amount of wealth invested in 
houses10. Notice however that average losses for people in the bottom deciles are 
substantial, even under SCENARIOS 1 and 2, and also their share is substantial (more than 
50 percent). This is the reason why, under SCENARIO 3, we correct the tax schedule by 
introducing a tax credit for low income earners, in order to avoid losses with respect to 
the simulated situation, and the implied difficulties in paying the tax bill typical of a 
situation where a figurative income is considered. 
 
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
These considerations with regard to winners and losers (and average gains and losses) in 
each decile are reflected in the average tax rates in the different scenarios. We compute, 
for each decile, average tax rate as the ratio between the net IRPEF and the gross 
income; of course, we include imputed rent in the taxable income as a result of the 
reform. These estimated average rates are reported in Figure 1, where deciles are 
identified on the pre-reform gross income. As can be easily seen, the reform breaks-
even between the third and the fourth deciles. Taxpayers in the bottom decile register a 
marked increase under both SCENARIO 1 and 2, whereas their situation worsens slightly 
                                                                                                                                               
Notice that the increase in marginal tax rates to keep revenues constant with respect to SCENARIO 1 is 
about 2 percent percent when allowing for a 20,000 euros tax credit. See Appendix, Figure A.1. 
10 These ‘house-rich, cash-poor’ individuals can be observed in all age classes. The elderly who lose are 
1.3 percent out of all the taxpayers in the first decile. Notice that the percentage of people older than 65 is 
19 percent in the first decile, and the IR is about 6 times their current IRPEF gross income. 
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under SCENARIO 311. On the other hand, those between the 5th and the 9th deciles in 
terms of income distribution obtain a sizeable reduction in their tax burden under all 
alternative scenarios. 
We further explore the issue of winners and losers by considering taxpayers’ ages. This 
analysis brings remarkable results, highlighting the generational orientation of Italian 
public policies already found in other works (e.g. Berloffa – Villa, 2010). The 
percentage of winners rapidly decreases, and – correspondingly – the percentage of 
losers increases with age in all three scenarios (Table 10). For instance, under SCENARIO 
1, 70.7 percent of taxpayers under 35 years of age will gain from the reform, while just 
12.7 percent will lose; on the other hand, just 32.2 percent  of people older than 65 will 
have a net gain, whereas 45.8 percent will suffer a loss. Interestingly, the average gain 
will decrease with age (also as a percentage of actual PIT gross income), while the 
average loss will increase (Table 11). Considering again for instance SCENARIO 1, the 
average gain is 956 euros for young people (4.9 percent  of income), and just 720 euros 
for the elderly (3.3 percent); the average loss is about 1,000 euros for the former (6.8 
percent of gross income), and 1,363 for the latter (7.6 percent). According to these 
figures, then, including IR in the IRPEF tax base will favour the younger generations. 
 
TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE 
 
Households. We rerun the same exercises by considering households instead of 
individual taxpayers, basically assuming that all individuals belonging to the same 
households will vote in favour of the reform only if tax debt at the household level is 
lower when including IR in the IRPEF tax base than under current tax rules. The results 
closely mirror those for individual taxpayers. Overall, under SCENARIO 1, 49.8 percent 
of all households (about 11.9 million) will gain from including IR in the IRPEF tax 
base, i.e. they will pay a net tax debt lower than the one paid under the current rules. 
This percentage drops to 48 percent under SCENARIO 2, and reach 49.6 percent under 
SCENARIO 3 (Table 12). As for the losers, the results show that SCENARIO 3 is slightly 
better than SCENARIO 1, and both are better than the remaining SCENARIO 2. Hence, as 
before, SCENARIO 3 is the one that maximises consensus in favour of the reform. The 
share of winners and losers is different across deciles also when households are 
considered instead of individuals taxpayers. But while the share of winners increases as 
before when moving from the bottom to the top deciles, with the highest values 
recorded for deciles in the middle of the income distribution, the share of losers is now 
increasing. Considering, for instance, SCENARIO 1, just 27.1 percent of households in the 
bottom decile lose with respect to the current situation as opposed to 46.9 percent in the 
top decile. The gradient in terms of the share of losers between the 1st and the 10th decile 
is even steeper under SCENARIO 3: from 12.2 percent to 50.7 percent. Most of the 
households in the bottom decile are now indifferent in all the three alternative 
scenarios12. Including IR in the IRPEF tax base will not worsen the economic situation 
                                                 
11 As pointed out by Garner – Short (2009), the modified market-value approach is likely to produce the 
highest value for low-income earners. This bias can at least partially explain our results. 
12 Also in this case we experimented with different levels of exemption by increasing the threshold above 
which the tax credit becomes zero up to 20,000 euros. There are no sizable effects for households in the 
1st decile, while an increase is observed in the 2nd, the 3rd and the 4th deciles. See Figure A.2 in the 
Appendix. 
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of the poor, while contemporaneously improving the position of the majority of middle-
income earners. 
Table 13 reports average gains and losses across deciles. Like for individuals, we 
observe an increase in both gains and losses across deciles also for households. One 
notable exception are households in the bottom decile under SCENARIO 3: the average 
loss is 1,158 euros for 12.2 percent of the poorest households according to their pre-
reform gross income. These are families with very low or even null labour income, but a 
large wealth invested in dwellings (hence, large figurative incomes). 
 
TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE 
TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Average tax rates in the different scenarios are represented in Figure 2. Most of the 
comments put forward for individuals hold also at the household level: middle-income 
earners register a reduction of average tax rates, while those in the bottom decile record 
an increase. But, differently from the individual taxpayer’s case, now the differences 
across scenarios are much more smoothed out, and the reform will break-even between 
the 2nd and the 3rd decile. 
Finally, we also extended the analysis by considering the age of the household head. 
Table 14 confirms that, for all the scenarios, the share of winners halves between 
households with heads below 35 years of age, and those with heads aged more than 65; 
on the contrary, the share of losers more than doubles when comparing the same two 
types of families. Also gains and losses show the same pattern: gains decrease when the 
age of the household head increases, while losses increase (Table 15). 
 
TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE 
TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we study whether an IRPEF reform aimed at reducing the tax burden on 
labour income - via the enlargement of the tax base due to the inclusion of imputed rent 
for owner-occupied dwellings – is likely to achieve a political majority. We use a 
micro-simulation model designed specifically to examine housing taxation in Italy. This 
model takes into account the BI-SHIW data as inputs, and compares the tax burden 
before and after the reform under three alternative scenarios, all designed in order to 
keep current revenues at a constant level: a first scenario in which, considering labour 
supply elasticities, marginal tax rates are lowered more for low income earners than for 
high income taxpayers; a second one in which all marginal tax rates are reduced by the 
same amount; and a third one in which we introduce a tax credit for low income 
taxpayers, in order to solve liquidity problems that can typically arise when taxing 
notional incomes. Our main result is that, under all the three scenarios, the share of 
winners is consistent, between 46 and 48 percent, while the share of losers is around one 
third of taxpayers. The percentage of winners is further increased when considering 
households instead of individual taxpayers, at about 50 percent; however, the share of 
losers is also substantial in this case, at about 40 percent. Overall, then, a political 
majority supporting the change is presumably achievable. This does not mean that the 
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reform will have an easy political ride. Notice, for instance, that reducing the tax wedge 
on labour income while contemporaneously taxing more housing would generate a 
redistribution towards younger generations. In a country where the median voter is 
rapidly ageing, favouring the young does not appear to be a good strategy for political 
parties that want to gain votes. 
Another shortcoming of the present study, which can have an effect on the main result, 
is the static nature of the microsimulation exercise. Considering behavioural responses, 
one should take into account the impact on housing prices once the reform is 
implemented. If, following the increase in taxation, prices will go up, also younger 
generations of renters and potential (future) owners would be less likely to vote in 
favour of the reform. Extending the model to incorporate also behavioural responses is a 
goal for our future research. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1. Changes in housing prices 2004-2009 (percent) 
 
Source: Agenzia del Territorio (2010). 
 
 
Area All towns Provincial capitals Non capitals 
Italy + 27 + 29 + 26 
North-West + 19 + 22 + 18 
North-East + 21 + 28 + 18 
Centre + 33 + 32 + 35 
South + 36 + 31 + 38 
Islands + 38 + 44 + 35 
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Table A.2. The evolution of housing taxation in Italy 
 
Period Main residence Unoccupied/holiday homes 
Rent Tax Allowances Other tax credits
Interests paid on 
mortgage 
Maintenance and 
restructuring 
expenditures 
Up to 1996 R included in the 
IRPEF tax base 
(rents blocked at 
average market 
values in 1988-
1989) 
Up to 516.46 euros to 
be subtracted from 
the main residence 
cadastral income 
22percent of up to 
about 3,500 euros of 
interest 
None Cadastral income augmented by 
one third as part of the PIT gross 
income 
From 1997 5 percent re-
evaluation of R 
Allowance raised to 
568.10 euros 
5 percent re-evaluation of R 
From 1998 19 percent of up to 
about 3,500 euros  of 
interests 
 
41 percent (36 
percent) of up to 
77,468.53 euros 
No changes in cadastral income; 
introduction of a tax credit with 
the same characteristics as the one 
introduced for the main residence 
From 1999 Up to 929.62 euros to 
be subtracted directly 
from the PIT gross 
income 
From 2000 Total exemption 
(allowance equal to 
re-evaluated R) 
From 2003 41 percent (36 
percent) of up to 
48,000 euros 
From 2008 19 percent of up to 
about 4,000 euros of 
interest 
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Figure A.1. Share of winners and increase in marginal tax rate  
for different levels of exemption 
(1st – 4th deciles, individual taxpayers) 
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Figure A.2. Share of winners and increase in marginal tax rate  
for different levels of exemption 
(1st – 4th deciles, households) 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
10 12 14 16 18 2010 12 14 16 18 20
1 2
3 4
Winners   (%) Increase of marginal tax rate   (%)
.
Level of exemption (Thousands of Euro)
Graphs by 10 quantiles of eqgrossy08 
 
21 
 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Distribution of households by decile of equivalent gross income 
Tenure status 
Decile 
Owner 
occupiers 
without 
mortgage or 
in usufruct 
Owner 
occupiers 
with 
mortgage 
Tenants or 
occupiers 
under 
redemption 
agreement 
Rent-free 
tenants Total 
1 54.8 4.5 33.2 7.5 100.0 
2 54.8 5.5 28.8 11.0 100.0 
3 60.9 4.9 27.5 6.7 100.0 
4 61.6 9.0 23.7 5.6 100.0 
5 60.1 8.2 24.7 6.9 100.0 
6 63.5 6.4 23.1 7.0 100.0 
7 65.7 11.4 18.1 4.9 100.0 
8 64.2 14.8 16.2 4.9 100.0 
9 66.3 16.4 13.8 3.5 100.0 
10 68.0 17.7 10.9 3.4 100.0 
Total 62.0 9.9 22.0 6.2 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW.    
 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Households by age class 
Tenure status 
Age class 
Owner 
occupiers 
without 
mortgage or 
in usufruct 
Owner 
occupiers 
with 
mortgage 
Tenants or 
occupiers 
under 
redemption 
agreement 
Rent-free 
tenants Total 
≤ 35 30.2 17.0 41.8 10.9 100.0 
> 35 & ≤ 65 58.1 13.0 22.4 6.5 100.0 
> 65 80.5 1.5 14.1 3.8 100.0 
Total 62.0 9.9 22.0 6.2 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW.    
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Tab. 3: Equivalent gross income by tenure status 
  Tenure status 
Gross income 
Owner 
occupiers 
without 
mortgage 
or in 
usufruct 
Owner 
occupiers 
with 
mortgage 
Tenants or 
occupiers 
under 
redemption 
agreement 
Rent-free 
tenants Total 
2008 mean income 104.7 129.5 78.6 82.0 100.0 
Mean income if net IR were taxed 127.0 141.6 79.3 82.3 115.2 
Gini coefficient for the 2008 distribution 0.37731 0.35840 0.34983 0.37725 0.37815 
Gini coefficient for the distribution with net IR 0.34702 0.34823 0.35258 0.37660 0.36607 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW.    
Tab. 4: Equivalent gross income by age class 
  Age class 
Gross income ≤ 35 > 35 & ≤ 65 > 65 Total 
2008 mean income 89.4 106.9 91.1 100.0 
Mean income if net IR were taxed 97.8 120.8 111.0 115.2 
Gini coefficient for the 2008 distribution 0.33253 0.37800 0.38206 0.37815 
Gini coefficient for the distribution with net IR 0.32414 0.36946 0.36602 0.36607 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW.   
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Table 5: Tax brackets and marginal tax rates 
    2008 SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3 (10,000 euros) 
Tax base (euro) Tax rate (percent) 
Tax rate 
(percent) Difference 
Tax rate 
(percent) Difference 
Tax rate 
(percent) Difference 
Up to 15,000 23 17.15 5.85 18.03 4.97 17.60 5.40 
15,000 28,000 27 22 5 22.03 4.97 22.45 4.55 
28,000 55,000 38 35 3 33.03 4.97 35.45 2.55 
55,000 75,000 41 38 3 36.03 4.97 38.45 2.55 
Above 75,000 43 41 2 38.03 4.97 41.45 1.55 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW.       
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Table 6: Equivalent net income by tenure status 
  Tenure status 
Net income 
Owner 
occupiers 
without 
mortgage 
or in 
usufruct 
Owner 
occupiers 
with 
mortgage 
Tenants or 
occupiers 
under 
redemption 
agreement 
Rent-free 
tenants Total 
2008 mean income 105.8 111.0 82.9 84.8 100.0 
Mean income SCENARIO 1 131.8 128.3 88.0 89.8 119.3 
Mean income SCENARIO 2 128.0 142.9 84.4 86.0 117.3 
Mean income SCENARIO 3 (10,000 euro) 127.6 141.9 84.4 85.8 116.9 
Gini coefficient for the 2008 distribution 0.32511 0.34186 0.30224 0.32576 0.32748 
Gini coefficient for the SCENARIO 1 distribution 0.29805 0.33001 0.31041 0.32978 0.31828 
Gini coefficient for the SCENARIO 2 distribution 0.30399 0.29718 0.32892 0.35014 0.32482 
Gini coefficient for the SCENARIO 3 distribution (10,000 euro) 0.29836 0.29255 0.32698 0.34712 0.32013 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW.    
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Table 7: Equivalent net income by age class 
  Age class 
Net income ≤ 35 > 35 & ≤ 65 > 65 Total 
2008 mean income 88.6 105.0 94.8 100.0 
Mean income SCENARIO 1 101.7 123.3 118.1 119.3 
Mean income SCENARIO 2 103.6 122.2 113.0 117.3 
Mean income SCENARIO 3 (10,000 euro) 103.6 121.8 112.7 116.9 
Gini coefficient for the 2008 distribution 0.29634 0.33222 0.32055 0.32748 
Gini coefficient for the SCENARIO 1 distribution 0.28664 0.32548 0.30903 0.31828 
Gini coefficient for the SCENARIO 2 distribution 0.29897 0.32543 0.3265 0.32482 
Gini coefficient for the SCENARIO 3 distribution (10,000 euro) 0.29573 0.3205 0.32191 0.32013 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW.   
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Table 8. Winners and losers from the IRPEF reform in each decile (individual taxpayers) 
  SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3 (10,000 euro) 
Decile Win Indifferent Lose Win Indifferent Lose Win Indifferent Lose 
1 6.9 39.4 53.7 6.4 37.8 55.7 21.4 74.0 4.6 
2 8.0 72.2 19.8 7.9 70.3 21.8 11.3 74.9 13.8 
3 31.1 38.5 30.4 29.4 36.9 33.7 30.6 37.5 31.9 
4 50.4 14.1 35.6 45.7 13.5 40.9 48.2 13.5 38.3 
5 59.5 4.8 35.6 55.6 4.8 39.6 57.2 4.8 37.9 
6 68.2 2.4 29.3 63.4 2.4 34.2 65.3 2.4 32.2 
7 72.4 0.0 27.6 68.9 0.0 31.1 69.8 0.0 30.2 
8 69.1 0.1 30.8 65.8 0.1 34.1 66.2 0.1 33.8 
9 59.9 0.0 40.1 59.0 0.0 41.0 56.7 0.0 43.3 
10 58.5 0.0 41.5 65.9 0.0 34.1 53.4 0.0 46.6 
All 48.4 17.2 34.4 46.8 16.6 36.6 48.0 20.8 31.2 
No. Taxpayers (mln) 20.1 7.1 14.3 19.4 6.9 15.2 19.9 8.6 13.0 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW.       
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Table 9. Average gain (loss) from the IRPEF reform in each decile (individual taxpayers) 
  SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3 (10,000 euro) 
  Win Lose Win Lose Win Lose 
Decile Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross 
income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross 
income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross 
income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross 
income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross 
income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross 
income 
1 70 7.2 -752 -103.3 68 6.7 -765 -103.4 77 10.2 -2828 -184.8 
2 291 5.4 -1079 -20.4 253 4.7 -1086 -20.4 280 5.4 -1288 -22.9 
3 383 4.3 -921 -10.4 350 3.9 -948 -10.8 367 4.1 -945 -10.7 
4 562 4.8 -837 -7.1 517 4.4 -852 -7.2 534 4.5 -853 -7.3 
5 693 4.7 -903 -6.1 616 4.2 -938 -6.4 655 4.4 -937 -6.4 
6 773 4.4 -879 -5.0 698 4.0 -876 -5.0 727 4.2 -899 -5.1 
7 875 4.4 -1129 -5.6 783 3.9 -1107 -5.5 813 4.1 -1146 -5.7 
8 971 4.2 -1411 -6.0 880 3.8 -1349 -5.8 903 3.9 -1419 -6.1 
9 1173 4.0 -1867 -6.4 1097 3.8 -1785 -6.1 1103 3.8 -1889 -6.5 
10 1819 2.8 -2848 -5.0 2347 3.5 -2708 -5.2 1679 2.6 -2824 -4.8 
Total 918 3.8 -1293 -6.7 953 3.8 -1218 -6.9 824 3.6 -1452 -6.2 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW.          
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Table 10. Winners and losers by age classes (individual taxpayers) 
  SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3 (10,000 euro) 
Age class Win Indifferent Lose Win Indifferent Lose Win Indifferent Lose 
≤ 35 70.7 16.6 12.7 69.7 16.3 14.0 71.8 18.7 9.5 
> 35 & ≤ 65 48.4 15.2 36.4 47.0 14.7 38.3 48.1 19.7 32.2 
> 65 32.2 22.0 45.8 29.9 20.9 49.2 30.6 24.6 44.8 
Total 48.4 17.2 34.4 46.8 16.6 36.6 48.0 20.8 31.2 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW.       
 
Table 11. Average gain (loss) by age class (individual taxpayers) 
  SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3 (10,000 euro) 
  Win Lose Win Lose Win Lose 
Age class Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross income 
≤ 35 956 4.9 -1002 -6.8 892 4.6 -947 -6.5 861 4.6 -1225 -5.8 
> 35 & ≤ 65 960 3.6 -1285 -6.2 1034 3.6 -1207 -6.4 853 3.4 -1466 -5.6 
> 65 720 3.3 -1363 -7.6 779 3.3 -1293 -7.8 662 3.2 -1465 -7.5 
Total 918 3.8 -1293 -6.7 953 3.8 -1218 -6.9 824 3.6 -1452 -6.2 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW.          
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Table 12. Winners and losers from the IRPEF reform in each decile (households) 
  SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3 (10,000 euro) 
Decile Win Indifferent Lose Win Indifferent Lose Win Indifferent Lose 
1 3.9 69.0 27.1 3.7 66.7 29.6 7.4 80.4 12.2 
2 27.0 38.6 34.5 25.9 36.8 37.2 30.5 40.1 29.5 
3 55.3 3.6 41.0 51.2 2.9 45.9 58.7 3.3 38.0 
4 59.0 0.1 40.9 53.8 0.1 46.1 61.0 0.1 39.0 
5 55.7 0.0 44.3 50.8 0.0 49.2 55.1 0.0 44.9 
6 61.8 0.0 38.2 56.0 0.0 44.0 58.0 0.0 42.0 
7 62.0 0.0 38.0 58.9 0.0 41.1 60.5 0.0 39.5 
8 61.0 0.0 39.0 59.5 0.0 40.5 59.2 0.0 40.8 
9 58.9 0.0 41.1 58.2 0.0 41.8 56.1 0.0 43.9 
10 53.1 0.0 46.9 62.1 0.0 37.9 49.3 0.0 50.7 
All 49.8 11.2 39.1 48.0 10.7 41.3 49.6 12.4 38.0 
No. Households (mln) 11.9 2.7 9.4 11.5 2.6 9.9 11.9 3.0 9.1 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW.        
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Table 13. Average gain (loss) from the IRPEF reform in each decile (households) 
  SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3  (10,000 euro) 
  Win Lose Win Lose Win Lose 
Decile Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross 
income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross 
income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross 
income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross 
income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross 
income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross 
income 
1 132 3.0 -710 -18.8 124 2.8 -706 -18.6 108 2.5 -1158 -26.8 
2 306 3.9 -640 -8.6 277 3.5 -675 -9.0 269 3.4 -714 -9.5 
3 396 3.9 -606 -6.0 356 3.5 -634 -6.4 365 3.6 -665 -6.7 
4 489 4.0 -751 -6.1 446 3.6 -769 -6.2 460 3.7 -813 -6.6 
5 582 3.9 -839 -5.6 528 3.5 -856 -5.7 551 3.7 -870 -5.8 
6 671 3.8 -743 -4.2 620 3.5 -748 -4.2 672 3.8 -747 -4.2 
7 748 3.6 -889 -4.3 662 3.2 -915 -4.4 688 3.3 -944 -4.6 
8 852 3.5 -1203 -4.9 751 3.1 -1202 -4.9 777 3.2 -1252 -5.2 
9 951 3.2 -1519 -5.1 886 2.9 -1449 -4.9 874 2.9 -1550 -5.2 
10 1555 2.5 -2446 -4.5 1967 3.1 -2329 -4.5 1392 2.2 -2532 -4.7 
Totale 744 3.3 -1075 -5.2 768 3.2 -1018 -5.3 672 3.0 -1176 -5.3 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW.          
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Table 14. Winners and losers by age classes of the household head (households) 
  SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3 (10,000 euro) 
Age class Win Indifferent Lose Win Indifferent Lose Win Indifferent Lose 
≤ 35 65.7 11.3 23.0 64.1 11.3 24.7 66.2 12.6 21.2 
> 35 & ≤ 65 54.5 9.2 36.3 53.3 9.0 37.7 54.8 10.7 34.6 
> 65 35.3 14.6 50.0 32.6 13.5 53.9 34.0 15.5 50.5 
Total 49.8 11.2 39.1 48.0 10.7 41.3 49.6 12.4 38.0 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW.       
 
Table 15. Average gain (loss) by age class of the household head (households) 
  SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3 (10,000 euro) 
  Win Lose Win Lose Win Lose 
Age class Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross income 
Euro 
percent of 
actual PIT 
gross income 
≤ 35 868 4.3 -841 -4.5 820 4.0 -815 -4.4 792 4.0 -944 -4.6 
> 35 & ≤ 65 760 3.2 -1006 -4.5 790 3.2 -949 -4.6 681 3.0 -1125 -4.7 
> 65 615 2.8 -1206 -6.4 665 2.8 -1141 -6.4 563 2.7 -1274 -6.5 
Totale 744 3.3 -1075 -5.2 768 3.2 -1018 -5.3 672 3.0 -1176 -5.3 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIW.          
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Figure 1. Average tax rates before and after the reform (individual taxpayers) 
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Figure 2. Average tax rates before and after the reform (households) 
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